Over the last year and a half we have seen an increased volume of complaints filed against SPAC boards in the Delaware Court of Chancery, challenging their decisions regarding de-SPAC mergers. In this article, Charlotte Newell, James Heyworth, and Josh DuClos discuss the increased scrutiny. (more…)
On March 30, 2022, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued proposed rules and amendments relating to special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), shell companies and the use of projections in SEC filings that, if adopted, would significantly rewrite the playbook for SPAC initial public offerings (IPOs) and acquisitions of private operating companies by SPACs (or “de-SPAC” transactions).1 In particular, the proposed rules (i) would require enhanced disclosures and increase potential liability under the federal securities laws for shell companies (including SPACs), target companies and investment banks participating in de-SPAC transactions, (ii) provide updated guidance regarding the use of projections in all SEC filings and (iii) propose a new safe harbor for SPACs under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Companies that have endured a corporate trauma are often faced with a two-headed monster of litigation: first, a federal securities class action, typically alleging that misstatements or omissions inflated the company’s stock price because the company failed adequately to predict, or disclose the likelihood of, the trauma; and, second, stockholder litigation claiming that the company’s directors (and sometimes officers) breached their state-law fiduciary duties in subjecting the company to the costs of defending or settling the securities litigation. In order to avoid (or at least defer unless and until necessary) the expense and distraction of litigating identical or overlapping issues in two or more fora, defendants often have sought a stay, by agreement or motion, of the fiduciary duty litigation, pending at least resolution of a threshold motion to dismiss in federal court. This approach has proven beneficial for all involved because it allows the parties to concentrate their resources in the federal proceeding that will determine whether viable disclosure claims have been alleged; if those claims fail, then there may no longer be any basis to pursue the state-law fiduciary duty claim and all can save the resources of litigating those claims in the meantime. (more…)
We previously wrote about the MultiPlan Corp. SPAC litigation relating to the de-SPAC merger of Churchill Capital Corp. III (“Churchill”) and its target, MultiPlan Corp. On January 3, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued its long-anticipated decision on the defendants’ motion to dismiss—the first dispositive motion to be briefed and decided in the Delaware courts in the wave of recent SPAC litigation. Below we highlight some key takeaways. (more…)
We previously wrote about the trend of SPAC (special purpose acquisition company) lawsuits filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery, with some combination of the post-merger entity, its board of directors, or the SPAC sponsor named as defendants. Over the course of this year, we have seen this trend continue, with a number of new SPAC lawsuits filed in the Court of Chancery since we last wrote on this topic. Several recent complaints filed in the Court of Chancery exemplify that the same recurring issues discussed in this space previously (e.g., alleged sponsor conflicts of interest, a hasty process to speedily complete a de-SPAC deal, lack of pre-merger diligence) likely will continue to feature prominently in SPAC litigations. (more…)
In NIRI’s IR Update, Derek Zaba, Kai Liekefett, and Joshua DuClos published an article titled, “SPACs: A New Frontier for Shareholder Activism.” Their article discusses how the SPAC boom has created a new breeding ground for activism targets and how SPACs should prepare for an activist attack. (more…)
Special purpose acquisition companies, or SPACs, are popular new tools for raising capital that have garnered significant attention and momentum over the past year. In 2020, 248 SPAC initial public offerings raised over $83 billion in capital—more than quadrupling the number of such offerings from the previous year and eclipsing the amount of capital they raised in 2019 by $69 billion. The amount and value of such offerings is set to grow exponentially again in 2021; as of April 1, 2021, 298 SPAC initial public offerings raised over $97 billion and an additional 247 SPACs filed for an IPO that had yet to close.
There have been few fully litigated cases relating to SPACs. Although many of the cases that have been filed have focused on federal securities law, the nature of SPACs and so-called de-SPACing transactions also potentially implicate a host of state law issues, particularly in connection with the fiduciary duties of directors. This article addresses several issues under Delaware law and how the unique features of SPACs may have an impact on the applicability of those rules.
As commented on in this space previously (here, here, and here), 2020 and the beginning of 2021 have seen an explosion in popularity of Special Purpose Acquisition Company (“SPAC”) deals. As readers know, SPACs have become one of the predominant vehicles for raising funds outside of the traditional IPO. Historically, SPACs have been the target of litigation relatively infrequently, but that trend is changing with the recent SPAC boom and the corresponding increase in public awareness and interest (including from regulators, short sellers, and the securities plaintiffs’ bar). Along with the increase in federal securities suits filed against pre- and post-de-SPAC companies, a trend likewise may be emerging in the Delaware Court of Chancery: a handful of stockholder suits alleging breach of fiduciary duties have been filed against SPAC entities and/or their boards of directors recently. We highlight a few below.
In 2020, a new acronym burst into the mainstream business lexicon: SPACs, or special purpose acquisition companies.
In the simplest sense, SPACs offer a faster, cheaper way of taking a company public. By sidestepping the expensive underwriting fees, arduous road shows, and unpredictable market pricing associated with initial public offerings (IPOs), SPACs have emerged as an attractive alternative strategy for investors and business owners alike.
Delaware Section 220 corporate books and records inspection demands have long been a precursor to stockholder litigation. Companies often challenge the propriety and scope of inspection demands and, even when companies ultimately produce books and records for inspection, they routinely do so subject to a confidentiality agreement. However, a February 28, 2022 letter decision in In re Lordstown Motors Corp., Stockholder Litigation illustrates how confidentiality agreements may not fully protect the information in those books and records from public disclosure or use in other litigation.