All the Outward Signs: In re Cloudflare and the Good Faith Condition of the Section 144 Safe Harbors

On October 16, 2026, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued In re Cloudflare, Inc. Stockholder Litigation (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2026) (available here).

Cloudflare sought to undertake a recapitalization whereby its founders would retain voting control of the company despite dilutive issuances. Applying amended Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), the Court of Chancery preliminarily enjoined the recapitalization. The defendants ― including Cloudflare, its directors, and the founders ― prevailed on every contested question of statutory interpretation under amended Section 144. Vice Chancellor Laster nevertheless concluded that the plaintiffs had a reasonable probability of showing that the special committee created to consider the recapitalization had not acted in good faith. On November 3, 2026, the court certified an interlocutory appeal on the good-faith standard and recommended that the Delaware Supreme Court hear it now. The interlocutory appeal was accepted on November 6.

Section 144 Background

On March 25, 2025, Delaware amended Section 144 to create statutory safe harbors for conflicted transactions involving fiduciaries, including controlling stockholders and control groups. Section 144(b) addresses transactions with controlling stockholders other than going-private transactions, whereas Section 144(c) specifically addresses going-privates undertaken by controllers. Cloudflare addresses the former, though it interprets standards that are also relevant to the latter. The Section 144(b) safe harbor bars equitable relief and damages if the transaction is (1) approved or recommended, in good faith and without gross negligence, by a majority of a committee of at least two directors whom the board has determined to be disinterested, and to which it has expressly delegated the authority to negotiate and reject the transaction; (2) conditioned on, and approved by, an informed, uncoerced vote of a majority of the votes cast by disinterested stockholders; or (3) fair to the corporation and the corporation’s stockholders.

The Court of Chancery has applied amended Section 144 in Ayers v. Foley (Del. Ch. June 15, 2026) and Dodiya v. Franklin (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2026). Our earlier coverage discusses Ayers and Dodiya.

The director-approval safe harbors in Section 144(a)(1), for transactions with interested directors and officers, and Section 144(b)(1) both require approval “in good faith and without gross negligence.” The statute defines neither term, but Delaware common law supplies their meaning. As Dodiya explained, “Bad faith is a culpable failure of loyalty; gross negligence is an extreme failure of care.”

Deal Background

Cloudflare’s co-founders, who also serve as the company’s CEO and president as well as co-chairs of the board, held substantially all of its 10-vote Class B stock. As they divested shares and the company issued one-vote Class A shares, their share of the voting power fell from 60% in 2021 to 50.3% in June 2026. At historical rates, they would lose majority control by the end of 2026.

In October 2025, the board formed a three-director special committee, which retained Delaware counsel and a financial advisor, held 18 meetings over six months, and generated hundreds of pages of minutes and presentation materials. It recommended exchanging the founders’ Class B shares for Class A shares and high-vote preferred stock, followed by a distribution of non-voting Class C shares. The founders agreed to economic ownership and service requirements and governance commitments, including a majority-independent board.

The committee unanimously recommended the recapitalization, which the court said dramatically expanded the founders’ ability to divest equity without losing voting control. The board approved it the next day. The recapitalization was put to a shareholder vote in different component proposals. Depending on the proposal, only 15.6% to 17.7% of the non-founder voting power voted in favor.

Analysis

According to the court, if gross negligence were the plaintiffs’ only challenge, an injunction would not be warranted. In Delaware entity law, gross negligence requires conduct akin to recklessness, and the committee’s process, with competent advisors, detailed materials, and regular meetings, had “all the outward signs of diligent and careful effort.” The absence of a fairness opinion did not change that injunction-stage conclusion.

However, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had a reasonable probability of showing that the committee failed to act in good faith by catering to the founders’ demands rather than serving the company’s interests. To act in good faith, a director must subjectively believe that an action serves the best interests of the company and its stockholders. Vice Chancellor Laster warned that loyalty and deference can lead directors to favor “proximate and powerful flesh-and-blood humans” over the corporation and its stockholders.

Defendants relied heavily on deposition testimony and lawyer-drafted minutes to oppose the injunction. In response, plaintiffs challenged that testimony with contemporaneous evidence suggesting the committee acted with a “controlled mindset,” including evidence that:

  • the financial advisor’s meeting notes suggested the committee’s advisors set out to build a narrative supporting the result, with concessions from the founders that would look like wins for the committee;
  • the committee pursued only the structures the CEO favored and sought an expert it knew would support continued founder control;
  • a committee member told the CEO, without authority, that he expected the committee to give the CEO what he wanted; and
  • the committee agreed to a capital-at-risk requirement demanded by the CEO only after he threatened to resign and two non-committee directors joined a committee meeting.

The founders and committee members also discussed the recapitalization in Signal chats that were set to delete messages, sometimes in as little as one day. At the injunction stage, the court could not credit testimony that the chats were non-substantive because certain surviving messages indicated otherwise. Although plaintiffs did not file a spoliation motion, the court drew inferences from the gaps, reasoning that the chats were the likeliest place for candid discussion.

The court acknowledged that the directors may have concluded in good faith that benefiting the founders served the company and its stockholders. Without the defendants’ credibility problems, including the Signal chat deletions and a broken commitment not to close before the ruling, the court said it could have concluded that the safe harbor was likely enough to apply to deny an injunction. Instead, the court held that the plaintiffs had shown a reasonable probability that the safe harbor would not apply and that the defendants could not prove the recapitalization entirely fair.

The defendants declined the court’s offer of a prompt trial limited to safe-harbor compliance and sought an interlocutory appeal. The court certified two questions. First, whether a director fails to act in good faith by consciously acting for a purpose other than the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders. Second, whether good faith may be assessed for the committee as a whole, rather than director by director, when the transaction itself is challenged. The court said that if the Supreme Court limits bad faith to malice or conscious lawbreaking, the defendants could obtain summary judgment, because the record shows neither.

Takeaways

The Court of Chancery has now analyzed both conditions of the director-approval safe harbors, with gross negligence deciding Dodiya and good faith deciding Cloudflare.

Gross negligence turns on the committee’s process and diligence, and good faith on its members’ subjective purpose. In Dodiya, directors tried to manage the conflict, but at the pleading stage it was reasonably conceivable that they were grossly negligent in failing to maintain their safeguards. In Cloudflare, the preliminary-injunction record supported a reasonably probable inference that the committee worked toward the founders’ preferred outcome.

In our view, Cloudflare shows the importance of a committee acting for the company and its stockholders and keeping a single contemporaneous record of its actual deliberations. Despite testimony and minutes depicting a careful committee, the advisors’ notes, the surviving Signal chat messages, and the deleted chats supported a reasonably probable inference that the committee was documenting a result already chosen.

This post is as of the posting date stated above. Sidley Austin LLP assumes no duty to update this post or post about any subsequent developments having a bearing on this post.