As regular readers know, this blog typically covers the latest developments and trends emerging from the Delaware Court of Chancery. For this post, however, we revisit first principles and remind our readers of the bedrock decisions of modern Delaware M&A practice, and highlight 11 key decisions with which every practitioner should be familiar. (more…)
Last month Vice Chancellor Zurn issued a significant, 200+ page decision on a motion to dismiss filed by defendants in the ongoing Pattern Energy transaction litigation, captioned In re Pattern Energy Group Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 2020-0357-MTZ. As we previously reported, class actions had been filed in Chancery Court and Delaware Federal District Court following the $6.1 billion going-private sale of Pattern Energy Group, Inc. to Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (“Canada Pension”). Both cases present overlapping breach of fiduciary duty claims. The Chancery Court case has moved forward faster, with that Court now issuing a decision denying defendants’ motion to dismiss. The decision is a reminder to directors and their advisers that without careful adherence to an independent sales process and transaction structure, directors risk losing the liability protections that Delaware law otherwise provides.
One focus of this blog has been identifying trends in other state’s corporate law that compares or contrasts with Delaware’s. Nevada in particular has long been in competition with Delaware as a potential place of incorporation. A new decision by the Nevada Supreme Court may further cement Nevada’s status as a potential competitor to Delaware for certain corporations by demonstrating the difficulty of rebutting the business judgment rule.
Last week, newly sworn-in Chancellor McCormick issued her first decision in her new role, Franchi v. Firestone, granting a motion to dismiss a shareholder complaint regarding a going-private transaction with a controlled shareholder. In doing so, the new Chancellor affirmed that the MFW roadmap continues to provide robust protection to such transactions, so long as they meet the formal requirements set out in MFW. (more…)
The Court of Chancery recently rejected a special committee’s motion to dismiss a case that had been commenced on the company’s behalf by a prior special committee. The decision clarifies the standard applicable to the unusual dueling-committee circumstances and offers several reminders of the rigorous assessment applicable to a board committee’s request to terminate litigation filed on the company’s behalf. (more…)
The Delaware Chancery Court recently held that, for a transaction involving a majority-conflicted board to be entitled to business judgment review (rather than the entire fairness standard), the special committee that approved the transaction must have been sufficiently constituted and authorized ab initio (i.e., “from the beginning”). Salladay v. Lev (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2020). In doing so, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III borrowed from the framework used to cleanse a controlling stockholder transaction under Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp. (MFW), 88 A.3d 624 (Del. 2014). Under MFW, a controlling stockholder transaction is entitled to business judgment review if the controller conditions the transaction ab initio on both the approval of an independent special committee and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.