The Delaware Chancery Court recently issued a rare preliminary injunction delaying the shareholder vote on a proposed merger between QAD, a cloud-based enterprise software company, and the private equity fund Thoma Bravo. The Court required additional disclosures to shareholders but stopped short of enjoining the deal entirely. The case provides useful guidance on conflicts-related disclosure where a controlling shareholder and minority shareholders are “competing” for consideration from a third-party acquirer. It also highlights Delaware’s reluctance to enjoin a transaction that offers shareholders a premium in the absence of a rival bidder, leaving post-closing damages claims as the sole remedy for shareholders who believe the deal involved contractual or fiduciary duty violations. (more…)
On September 13, 2021, over a rare dissent, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of a petition for appraisal filed by minority stockholders (the “Petitioners”) of Delaware corporation Authentix Acquisition Company, Inc. (“Authentix”). The high court agreed that the Petitioners could waive the statutory right to an appraisal through provisions in a stockholder agreement (the “Stockholders Agreement”). Significantly, this ruling may open the door for corporations to contractually waive other permissions portions of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”). (more…)
On October 13, 2021, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III issued a post-trial decision affirming the CytoDyn Inc. board of directors’ decision to reject a stockholder nomination of directors for failure to supply information required by the company’s advance notice bylaw. This is the first decision from a Delaware court addressing informational deficiencies in such a nomination notice, and provides important guidance for the many public companies with similar bylaws. (more…)
Two years ago the Delaware Supreme Court, in Marchand v. Barnhill, allowed Caremark claims to proceed against a group of directors in connection with a listeria outbreak at their company’s ice cream manufacturing plants. Applying Caremark — often quoted as “possibly the most difficult theory in corporat[e] law” — the court determined the board failed to implement reasonable oversight and monitoring on “mission critical issues.” There, food safety was “mission critical.” Since Marchand¸ courts have applied these principles to, among other cases, a biopharmaceutical company’s failure to comply with FDA regulations and an auto parts company’s failure to properly monitor its financial reporting. Now, the Delaware Chancery Court has provided another guidepost, this time in the aerospace industry, finding that certain of Boeing’s stockholders adequately pled Caremark claims against Boeing’s Board. (more…)
On Sept. 7, the Delaware Chancery Court allowed In re: The Boeing Co. Derivative Litigation to proceed, surviving a motion to dismiss.
The action alleges that directors breached their fiduciary duties with respect to their oversight of safety issues and arises out of two crashes of the company’s 737 MAX aircraft. (more…)
A pair of opinions released by the Delaware Supreme Court in a single week have revisited longstanding precedent governing shareholder suits that claim corporate wrongdoing. As discussed in a companion post on this blog, the first of those opinions, Brookfield Asset Management Inc. v. Rosson, restricted the ability of shareholders to bring direct claims under certain circumstances, instead forcing them to pursue more procedurally challenging derivative suits. In the second case, United Food & Commercial Workers Union & Participating Food Industry Employers Tri-State Pension Fund v. Zuckerberg, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted a new three-part demand-futility test that clarifies the standard shareholders must meet to file such derivative suits, without first taking their complaints to the company’s board of directors. (more…)
Every once in a while, a court admits it made a mistake. And, in even rarer circumstances, that admission comes from a court as prominent as the Supreme Court of Delaware. But that’s exactly what happened last week in Brookfield Asset Management, Inc. v. Rosson, in which Delaware’s highest court overruled its own 2006 holding in Gentile v. Rosette that certain claims of corporate dilution are “dual-natured” and may be pursued both as derivative claims and as direct claims by stockholders. The Court’s decision to revisit a much-criticized decision is likely to restore some predictability and analytic consistency to the resolution of an important and threshold question frequently presented in stockholder litigation: whether a claim is properly characterized as direct (on behalf of one or a class of a company’s stockholders) or derivative (on behalf of the company itself). (more…)