Two Cautionary Tales: Fee Shifting Imposed for Litigating Books-and-Records Inspection Demands
While there are limits to a stockholder’s right to inspect books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law or other sections allowing inspection—and corporations can negotiate the scope of inspection—there are also limits to how vigorously a corporation can resist a stockholder’s inspection demand, particularly when it does not present novel legal issues. Two recent fee-shifting decisions issued by Vice Chancellor Zurn provide a cautionary reminder of those limits, which were previously set out by the Court of Chancery in opinions such as Pettry v. Gilead Scis. Inc. (2020), Marilyn Abrams Living Trust v. Pope Invs. Inc. (2017), and McGowan v. Empress Entm’t (2000). The unmistakable message: if the right to inspection is clear, a defendant should think twice about a blanket opposition, unless the defendant does not mind paying the plaintiff’s legal fees in the end.
Special Committees Require Special Attention: Lessons from GoDaddy
Previously this blog has discussed the importance of procedural compliance with various transaction structures when the transaction involves controlling or interested parties (see an example here). For instance, in Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (“MFW”), the Delaware Supreme Court held that compliance with certain process elements enables deferential business judgment review of decisions regarding interested transactions with controlling parties (see here for a helpful discussion about MFW protections). Delaware courts have since expanded the role of MFW-like process protections in various contexts, thus demonstrating that adequate decisionmaking procedures are a central prerequisite to business judgment deference when controllers or interested parties are involved in contemplated transactions.
Good Fences Make Good Neighbors and Preserve Attorney-Client Privilege in the Boardroom: A Word of Caution for Boards Navigating Potential Disputes Among Directors or With Funds They Manage
The boardroom frequently presents attorney-client privilege and work product protection issues. The Delaware Court of Chancery’s recent decision in Hyde Park Venture Partners Fund III, LP v. FairXchange, LLC, C.A. No. 2022-0344-JTL (Del. Ch. March 9, 2023), provides a reminder of the importance of vigilance in considering when and how to limit a director’s access to privileged materials in circumstances where directors’ interests may diverge – particularly where directors manage, or are affiliated with, investment funds owning stock of the Company.
ISS and Glass Lewis Proxy Voting Policy Updates for the 2023 Proxy Season
Proxy advisory firms Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis & Co. (Glass Lewis) have updated their proxy voting policies for shareholder meetings held on or after February 1, 2023 (ISS) or January 1, 2023 (Glass Lewis). This Sidley Update summarizes the changes in proxy voting policies that apply to U.S. companies and provides some practical considerations.
Board’s Good-Faith Oversight of “Mission Critical” Risks Insulates Directors from “Caremark” Claim
In 1996, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued its seminal decision in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, which establishes the framework for director oversight liability under Delaware law. Over time, Delaware courts frequently observed that this type of claim was “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment,” and these claims rarely advanced beyond the motion-to-dismiss stage. However, in a three-year span beginning in 2019, Delaware courts denied motions to dismiss Caremark claims in five cases, leading some to question whether the Caremark standard has been relaxed. A recent Court of Chancery decision issued earlier this summer provides an important counterpoint to this recent commentary, while underscoring that boards must exercise rigorous oversight over “mission critical” risks.
“Thick-As-Thieves” Narrative Persuades Court That Director Independence Is In Question in Carvana
The Delaware Court of Chancery recently denied a motion to dismiss stockholder derivative claims against Carvana Co. arising out of a stock offering Carvana announced in March 2020. The Court found that, based on the plaintiff’s allegations, it was reasonably conceivable that the stock offering had been orchestrated to take advantage of pandemic-related market volatility to benefit investors hand-selected by Carvana’s controlling stockholders. In doing so, the Court rejected the defendants’ arguments of demand futility and provided useful guidance regarding the types of allegations necessary to establish a director’s lack of independence.
