Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III recently declined to grant a motion to dismiss in Paul Capital Advisors, L.L.C. et al. v. Holland, 2023 WL 5551017, C.A. No. 2022-0167-SG (Del. Aug. 29, 2023) (“Paul Capital”), which involved claims arising out of an intricate set of transactions intended to monetize certain illiquid assets. In sustaining the claims, the Court of Chancery colorfully outlined the challenges of deciphering a highly complex, “monkey’s fist of contracts” without accompanying provisions describing the purpose for such complexity in the first place, and encouraged practitioners to instead choose the path of simplicity.
The Delaware Court of Chancery’s recent opinion in Cygnus Opportunity Fund LLC et al. v. Washington Prime Group LLC et al. presents a veritable grab bag of potential blog posts, from a suggestion that an officer of an Limited Liability Company could be contractually bound by an LLC Agreement he never signed to the interesting interplay (and potential conflict) between an officer’s duty of obedience to the LLC’s board and the officer’s duty of disclosure to investors. The focus here — and we believe chief among the thorny issues addressed in Cygnus — is the Court of Chancery’s decision to sustain a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to an issue that the LLC Agreement expressly addressed. What makes it even more fascinating is the tone of the Opinion: Vice Chancellor Laster evidently came to an early conclusion that, taking the allegations as true for purposes of a pleading motion, there was some inherent unfairness in the Defendants’ conduct that needed to be set right. Left unclear is the impact of this decision, assuming it is not disturbed on appeal, on Delaware’s long-standing deference to parties’ agreements and, in particular, limitations of duties, in the LLC context. In any event, the Opinion should serve as a cautionary tale for companies considering converting to an LLC form through a non-consensual bankruptcy process.
Limited liability companies, as “alternative entities” under Delaware law, enjoy significantly greater freedom in ordering their internal affairs than do corporations. The contractarian bent of Delaware law is at its height in both the legislative and the judicial treatment of LLCs. Unlike corporations, LLCs may contract out of fiduciary duties on the part of their managers, and may control the nature and availability of remedies for breach of an LLC agreement.
Just as a $700 million damages award and its accompanying sharp criticism of legal opinions garner headlines, so does reversal of that ruling. The Delaware Supreme Court closed out 2022 with its decision in Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP v. Bandera Master Funds LP, reversing the Court of Chancery’s sizeable post-trial award on narrow contractual grounds. The reversal is a substantial victory for the defendants. But for non-parties, of note was the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision to leave intact the trial court’s conclusions regarding law firm opinions. Taken together, both courts’ rulings offer meaningful guidance for parties and counsel negotiating complex transactions and considering inclusion of opinion of counsel conditions (or, attempting to satisfy such conditions in existing contracts).
On January 6, 2023, Vice Chancellor Laster issued an opinion in Fairstead Capital Management LLC v. Blodgett concerning a “dispute-resolution collision” between two applicable forum-selection clauses. The collision arises from the termination of a principal of an investment fund, whose partners fired him for allegedly breaching his employment agreement and also cancelled his member interests in two LLCs that owned rights to the profits generated by the fund. Unhappy with his ouster, the former principal wanted to litigate against his former partners and the LLCs. But that raised the question at the core of this Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion: where to litigate?
As previously covered in this blog, the recent increase in litigation arising out of de-SPAC mergers has left some open questions as to how courts will apply traditional legal principles to the unique SPAC structure. The Delaware Court of Chancery, for example, stated in Lordstown Motors that SPAC litigation “raises emerging issues of Delaware law,” while at the same time cautioning in MultiPlan that “well-worn fiduciary principles” generally apply to claims for breach of fiduciary duty in a de-SPAC merger. There understandably is some uncertainty in this space — particularly given the recent stipulation of settlement filed in the MultiPlan litigation, which some commentators had hoped would provide further insights. Thankfully, the Delaware Court of Chancery has recently provided some potentially helpful guidance in the ongoing P3 Health Group Holdings litigation. There, Vice Chancellor Laster addressed claims for breach of a limited liability company agreement related to a de-SPAC merger. In granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Vice Chancellor provided some clarity on how to assess the nature of the pre- and post-de-SPAC merger entities, and in doing so adhered closely to standard principles of Delaware contract law.
In In re: Dissolution of Doehler Dry Ingredient Solutions, LLC (Sept. 15, 2022), the Delaware Court of Chancery recently restated the high bar for a claim for judicial dissolution to succeed. Following his removal by written consent, a minority member and former manager of a Delaware limited liability company brought a claim for judicial dissolution of the entity. The former manager alleged that judicial dissolution was warranted due to alleged breaches of the company’s operating agreement, a potential voting deadlock on important matters, and alleged breaches of fiduciary duties.
The Delaware Court of Chancery recently interpreted the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act’s (“LLC Act”) provision for service on any “person” who “participates materially in the management” of a Delaware LLC as sufficient to support implied consent to Delaware jurisdiction by a Delaware LLC’s general counsel. In past cases, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that this material-participation standard applies to LLC officers who hold the title of president and perform functions customarily associated with that role. But in In re P3 Health Group Holdings, LLC, No. 2021-0518-JTL, Vice Chancellor Laster considered the plain meaning of “participates materially” and those words’ “natural habitat” in other statutes like the federal tax code and Delaware General Corporation Law’s (“DGCL”) consent-to-jurisdiction statute for corporate officers, and held that the LLC Act’s consent-to-jurisdiction statute extends to any person who holds a “C-suite” position in a Delaware LLC, including an LLC’s general counsel. C-suite executives of Delaware LLCs should thus anticipate that they may be subject to jurisdiction in Delaware for claims involving their actions as senior officers of a Delaware entity going forward.
In her first true Opinion for the Court, In re Coinmint, LLC, Vice Chancellor Zurn delved deeply into the tortured relationship between the two founders (and sole members) of Coinmint, LLC, a bitcoin mining firm, and ultimately held that Delaware’s strong preference for private ordering is not unlimited where the parties fail entirely to follow the formalities set out in the founding documents to which they collectively agreed.
A recent opinion issued by the Delaware Court of Chancery in Stone & Paper Investors LLC v. Blanch resolved dueling allegations of corporate mismanagement and fraud that pitted a pair of long-time business partners against their protégé and his associates. In the 100+ page opinion, Vice Chancellor Paul A. Fioravanti, Jr., described a years-long scheme to induce a multi-million dollar investment in a new stone-based paper venture and then, when that venture fizzled, to drain the invested funds for personal gain in a series of undisclosed interested transactions. The facts of this case are extreme and involve an extended pattern of intentional wrongdoing. However, as an illustration of what can happen when bad actors take control, Stone & Paper provides important guidance to honest managers and other interested parties who draw salaries from, or otherwise transact with, the companies they control. Interested parties who engage in such transactions should take care that the material facts underlying any interested transactions have been fully disclosed and that they have complied with the requirements of the operating agreement, including documenting any necessary approvals. And if, by inadvertence or mistake, managers fail to secure the necessary approval for these transactions in advance, they should disclose all of the material facts as promptly as possible after the fact, such that the Board may be deemed to have acquiesced in the transactions.