Top 15 Posts of 2024
In 2024, Enhanced Scrutiny provided in-depth and practical insights related to M&A and corporate governance decisions and developments from the Delaware courts and other jurisdictions. Read the most popular posts from the past year below. We look forward to continuing our coverage in 2025.
The Delaware Court of Chancery has promoted the use of forum selection clauses in corporate charters since its 2010 opinion In re Revlon Inc. Shareholders Litigation. Three years later, in Boilermakers v. Chevron, the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled that forum selection clauses in corporate bylaws are facially valid for types of shareholder litigation, including derivative claims, fiduciary claims, statutory claims under the Delaware General Corporation Law, and claims regarding internal affairs. In light of these decisions, Delaware forum selection clauses contained in corporate charters or bylaws of the type found facially valid in Boilermakers have been enforced by state courts in many states. But a recent decision from a California appellate court suggests that some California courts may be resistant to such provisions based on California public policy in favor of the right to a jury trial.
Five Delaware Cases All Venture Capital Players Should Know
Now and then this blog publishes compendiums of bedrock decisions and key principles of which M&A and Corporate Governance practitioners, and their clients, should be aware. This post takes the opportunity to highlight five relatively recent and important decisions that have shaped Delaware legal practice and discourse involving venture capital investment. Counsel representing investors and other players in emerging growth companies should familiarize themselves with this digest.
New Year’s Surprise: Portions of Cloudy Day Advance Notice Bylaw Amendments Called into Question
The Delaware Court of Chancery rang in the new year with a decision calling into question certain provisions in a company’s advance notice bylaws, which had been adopted in the face of an upcoming proxy fight. On the whole, the Kellner v. AIM Immunotech Inc. decision is yet another reminder of the critical importance of advance notice bylaws and that they are often enforced by Delaware courts. But companies should work with counsel to consider the impact of this decision on their own bylaws, bearing in mind that considerations may change based on the outcome of a now-pending appeal in Kellner.
Delaware Court of Chancery Says It’s Game Over on Massive Fees for “Minuscule” Work
Last month, in an oral ruling likely to bring great joy to the Delaware defense bar, Vice Chancellor Zurn issued an atypical “Statement of the Court” in Garfield v. Getaround that swiftly rejected an $850,000 fee request in a derivative action. Plaintiff sought the fee for its efforts in prompting Defendant Getaround Inc. to make changes to its voting structure. Calling attention to the slew of similar actions by stockholders following Garfield v. Boxed, Vice Chancellor Zurn said the “game is over” for attorneys’ “making a literal fortune off of a minuscule number of hours of work.”
A Judicial Notice That Judicial Notice Has Its Limits
In a significant decision the week before the Christmas holiday, the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed the Delaware Court of Chancery’s dismissal of Lebanon County Employees’ Retirement Fund v. Collis et al. (“Lebanon”), reinstating stockholder derivative claims against the directors of AmerisourceBergen Corporation arising out of the Company’s wholesale distribution of prescription opioids in the United States. Interested readers can view our blog’s prior discussion of the Court of Chancery’s dismissal here.
On February 23, 2024, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued an opinion in West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Moelis & Co. invalidating certain stockholder agreement provisions that gave a significant stockholder broad pre-approval rights over corporate actions. The opinion serves as a reminder of the contours of board authority under DGCL Section 141(a) and how contractual agreements may “improperly constrain a board’s authority.” It remains to be seen if the decision will be appealed, but at present, it should be evaluated by parties considering contractual provisions that may directly or indirectly limit director decision-making.
Even After Multiplan, Pleading Standards Still Have Teeth in SPAC Cases
In 2022, the Delaware Court of Chancery decided In re MultiPlan Corp. S’holders Litig., 268 A.3d 784 (Del. Ch. 2022) (“Multiplan”), a landmark case setting the legal framework for assessing claims that the directors of a Special Purpose Acquisition Company (“SPAC”) breached their fiduciary duties in connection with “de-SPAC” mergers. Given the popularity of de-SPAC mergers, in which the SPAC merges with a private target company and takes it public, the Delaware courts have been faced with a series of cases initiated by public stockholders who did not redeem their shares at the time of the merger but became unhappy when the post-merger public companies underperformed. The focus of those cases is the redemption right: whether stockholders in the SPAC were properly informed when they made the critical decision at the time of the merger to either redeem their shares or remain invested in the newly public company.
On February 29, 2024, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued an opinion in Sjunde AP-Fonden v. Activision Blizzard questioning a number of common practices for target companies in a merger, including the process for obtaining board approval of a merger agreement and the contents of the notice of the stockholders’ meeting to approve the merger agreement, and allowing a challenge to the validity of the subject merger to proceed. It is an important read for all involved in M&A and will undoubtedly have an impact on market practice.
“Bad Things Can Happen to Corporations” – But Officers Cannot Be Liable Absent Bad Faith
In Segway, Inc. v. Cai, the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed one of the increasingly common breach of fiduciary duty cases brought against corporate officers after last year’s seminal McDonald’s decision, which clarified that officers owe a duty of oversight just as directors do. No doubt reassuringly for those officers, Vice Chancellor Will corrected the “misimpression that an oversight claim pursued against an officer is easier to plead than one against a director.” The opinion definitively confirms that “bad faith remains a necessary predicate to any Caremark claim.”
When companies settle proxy contests with activist stockholders, the activists generally give up stockholder-level influence in exchange for board-level influence. In a typical agreement in this setting, activists gain board seats in exchange for a commitment to vote their shares with the board’s recommendation on proposals put to stockholders. Activists also agree to standstill periods in which they refrain from taking actions opposed to the board, and from increasing their holdings above a specified cap.
Delaware’s Appealing Interlocutory Review Regime
In a recent case, Palkon v. Maffei (TripAdvisor), the Delaware Supreme Court accepted an interlocutory appeal of the Court of Chancery’s denial of shareholders’ motion to dismiss. Such appeals are not common: Delaware Supreme Court Rule 42(b) expressly provides that “[i]nterlocutory appeals should be exceptional, not routine, because they disrupt the normal procession of litigation, cause delay, and can threaten to exhaust scarce party and judicial resources.” Even more unusually, the Delaware Supreme Court took this step over the Court of Chancery’s refusal to certify the appeal. This decision and others demonstrate the Delaware Supreme Court’s willingness to step in affirmatively, even mid-case, to ensure the coherence and predictability of corporate governance law — particularly when a matter of public concern is at stake.
Last month, Vice Chancellor Glasscock dismissed shareholder claims in Teamsters Local 443 Health Services & Insurance Plan v. John C. Chou (Del. Ch. Nov. 17, 2023) (“Teamsters II”) after finding that a single-member special litigation committee (“SLC”) had sufficiently investigated the stockholder’s allegations before recommending dismissal. Vice Chancellor Glasscock’s decision is not the first time that the Court of Chancery approved a single-member SLC’s motion to dismiss a derivative suit. For example, in April 2023, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will granted a single-member SLC’s motion to terminate a shareholder action In re Baker Hughes Derivative Litig., 2023 WL 2967780 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2023).
Acquisitions of biotech companies with development-stage drug candidates often include earnout agreements. The buyer pays the seller’s stockholders with cash or stock upfront, and the seller’s stockholders are entitled to additional payments if the drug or drugs in development reach certain milestones, often culminating in FDA approval or commercialization. Achieving those milestones can take many years and requires the buyer to make substantial investments in clinical trials and regulatory approval. Because the right to earnout payments depends to a significant degree on a buyer’s actions in developing the asset, a seller will seek a provision in the acquisition agreement requiring the buyer to use commercially reasonable efforts in drug development.
Following amendments in August 2022 to Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporate Law (“DGCL”) to allow corporations to include provisions in their respective charters exculpating officers for breaches of the duty of care, a number of corporations naturally took steps to add such provisions. Stockholder challenges followed in In re Fox Corp./Snap Section 242 Litigation, No. 120, 2023, 2024 WL 176575 (Del. Jan. 17, 2024), as revised (Jan. 25, 2024), which involved parallel lawsuits contesting the manner in which two separate corporations with multi-class capital structures adopted amendments providing for officer exculpation. The Delaware Supreme Court ultimately affirmed a lower court decision in favor of the corporations, holding that, consistent with their respective charters, the corporations validly obtained approval from stockholder classes permitted to vote and validly excluded from the vote non-voting stockholder classes.
Carvana SLC Drives Away Derivative Case
On March 27, 2024, Chancellor McCormick granted the Carvana Special Litigation Committee’s motion to dismiss after finding no wrongdoing by the Company’s controlling stockholders in connection with its March 2020 direct offering and the controlling stockholders’ subsequent sale of Company stock for over US$1 billion. See https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=362010.
This post is as of the posting date stated above. Sidley Austin LLP assumes no duty to update this post or post about any subsequent developments having a bearing on this post.
