Look at the Big Picture: A Message to Boards Seeking Business Judgment Rule Protection
In City of Sarasota Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court provided additional guidance on the contours of the MFW framework and its application – a timely reminder that stockholders (and courts) are looking at the big picture when assessing disclosures in the MFW context.
Delaware’s Appealing Interlocutory Review Regime
In a recent case, Palkon v. Maffei (TripAdvisor), the Delaware Supreme Court accepted an interlocutory appeal of the Court of Chancery’s denial of shareholders’ motion to dismiss. Such appeals are not common: Delaware Supreme Court Rule 42(b) expressly provides that “[i]nterlocutory appeals should be exceptional, not routine, because they disrupt the normal procession of litigation, cause delay, and can threaten to exhaust scarce party and judicial resources.” Even more unusually, the Delaware Supreme Court took this step over the Court of Chancery’s refusal to certify the appeal. This decision and others demonstrate the Delaware Supreme Court’s willingness to step in affirmatively, even mid-case, to ensure the coherence and predictability of corporate governance law — particularly when a matter of public concern is at stake. (more…)
Special Committees Require Special Attention: Lessons from GoDaddy
Previously this blog has discussed the importance of procedural compliance with various transaction structures when the transaction involves controlling or interested parties (see an example here). For instance, in Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (“MFW”), the Delaware Supreme Court held that compliance with certain process elements enables deferential business judgment review of decisions regarding interested transactions with controlling parties (see here for a helpful discussion about MFW protections). Delaware courts have since expanded the role of MFW-like process protections in various contexts, thus demonstrating that adequate decisionmaking procedures are a central prerequisite to business judgment deference when controllers or interested parties are involved in contemplated transactions.
Entire Fairness Does Not Require Perfection
The Delaware Supreme Court recently held in In re Tesla Motors Stockholders’ Litigation, ___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL 3854008 (Del. Jun. 6, 2023) (“Tesla”), that an entire fairness analysis does not require perfection, so long as the acquisition itself was the result of fair dealing and fair price. Practitioners and boards engaging with a potentially conflicted transaction would be well served to study this opinion with care, particularly where the potential acquiror cannot (or chooses not to) employ a special committee of independent directors to handle negotiations.
Procedure Prevails When Applying MFW Framework to Interested Merger
The Delaware Court of Chancery recently issued an opinion that reminds controlling stockholders they can successfully implement a going private merger even when a competing bidder makes an offer that is substantially higher than that offered by the controlling stockholder. The court dismissed a lawsuit brought by former Eidos Therapeutics, Inc. stockholders against Bridgebio Pharma, Inc. and three of its directors over a merger in which Bridgebio, as Eidos’s controlling stockholder, acquired the remaining minority shares of Eidos stock. Smart Loc. Unions & Councils Pension Fund v. BridgeBio Pharma, Inc., No. 2021-1030-PAF, 2022 WL 17986515 (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2022).
Key Learnings Regarding the Protectiveness of the MFW Process for Controlling Stockholder Transactions
The Delaware Court of Chancery’s recent decision in City Pension Fund for Firefighters and Police Officers in the City of Miami v. The Trade Desk, Inc. et al., which granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, demonstrates how protective the MFW process of both an independent special committee of the board and a majority of the minority stockholder vote can be in a transaction with a controlling stockholder. This post provides a reminder concerning the MFW process and highlights two key learnings from the Trade Desk decision, one concerning independence and the second concerning the minority vote.
